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CONVEYANCING
Return of deposits
In what circumstances will the courts order the return of a
deposit? Mark Pawlowski reviews old and new case law
‘There may be little or no
practical distinction
between a deposit and a
penalty but English courts
have shown a marked
reluctance to apply the law
of penalties to deposits.’
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor 
of property law in the
department of law at the
University of Greenwich
A
contract of sale will often call for
the immediate payment of a spec-
ified sum by the buyer as a
guarantee or security that the contract will
be performed. Where the buyer defaults,
forfeiture will be implied from the mere
fact that the sum is stated to be paid as a
‘deposit’ (see Wallis v Smith [1882]). By
contrast, as a general rule, the seller is
bound to return money that constitutes a
‘part payment’ of the purchase price.
Ultimately, it is a question of construction
to determine into which category the sum
payable falls and whether it is forfeitable
(see Howe v Smith [1884]).
Law of penalties
Although there may be little or no practi-
cal distinction between a deposit and a
penalty (particularly where the deposit
has fallen due for payment under the con-
tract but remains unpaid by the buyer),
English courts have shown a marked
reluctance to apply the rule relating to
relief against penalties to deposits even in
circumstances where the sum deposited is
wholly out of proportion to the actual or
probable loss accruing to the seller. In the
leading case of Wallis, referred to above,
Jessel MR said:
Where a deposit is to be forfeited for the
breach of a number [of] stipulations, some
of which may be trifling, some of which
may be for the payment of money on a
given day, in all those cases the Judges have
held that [the rule relating to relief against
penalties] does not apply, and that the bar-
gain of the parties is to be carried out. 
Similarly, in Hinton v Sparkes [1868],
Bovill CJ said:
The numerous cases referred to as to the
distinction between penalty and liqui-
dated damages have in my judgment no
application to a contract [involving the
forfeiture of a deposit].
There is, however, some English
authority to support the proposition that
equity does have jurisdiction to grant
positive relief (apart from a mere exten-
sion of time to pay) against forfeiture of
a deposit in circumstances where the
sum retained is out of all proportion to
the damage sustained and where it
would be unconscionable for the seller
to retain the money (see, for example,
Brickles v Snell [1916]; Stockloser v Johnson
[1954]; Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge
[1962]; Workers Trust & Merchant Bank
Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd [1993]).
Section 49(2) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925
In the context of a contract for the sale of
land, a seller’s right at law to forfeit the
purchaser’s deposit is mitigated by
s49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925,
which gives the court a wide discre-
tionary power to order the repayment of
any deposit ‘if it thinks fit’, dependent
on a general consideration of the con-
duct of both parties (especially the
purchaser), the gravity of the matters 
in question and the amount at stake
(Schindler v Pigault [1975] and Universal
Corporation v Five Ways Properties Ltd
[1979]). Although the jurisdiction is
statutory, nevertheless, its discretionary
character has been held to be at least
akin to equitable relief against forfeiture
(see Schindler per Megarry J). The 
subsection provides:
Where the court refuses to grant specific
performance of a contract, or in any action
for the return of a deposit, the court may,
if it thinks fit, order the repayment of any
deposit.
While any limitation or restriction on
the scope of the court’s discretion under
s49(2) would appear to be inappropriate
in view of the broad wording of the sub-
section itself, it is apparent that a
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number of guidelines have emerged
from case law as to the circumstances in
which the discretion to relieve from for-
feiture should be exercised in favour of a
purchaser. The most recent guidance has
come from the Court of Appeal in
Aribisala v St James’ Homes (Grosvenor
Dock) Ltd [2008].
Previous caselaw
In Cole v Rose [1978] Mervyn Davies QC
interpreted Megarry J’s observations in
Schindler, above, as meaning that proof of
some special circumstances (suggesting
that it was unfair or inequitable that the
purchaser should lose their deposit) was
necessary to bring a case within s49(2).
However, this narrow view was not fol-
lowed by Buckley LJ in Universal
Corporation, who preferred the view of
Megarry J to the effect that the court had
an unqualified discretion under the sub-
section to order repayment of the deposit
when this would represent the ‘fairest
course between the parties’, subject only
to the discretion being exercised judi-
cially and with due regard to all the
relevant circumstances, including the
terms of the contract.
In Dimsdale Developments v De Hann
[1983] the Court expressed some doubt
about the appropriateness of applying
the discretion to a defaulting purchaser
in a case where the seller was entitled to
specific performance of the contract. In
the Court’s view, s49(2) was plainly
enacted to confer a discretion in cases
where the seller was for some reason not
entitled to specific performance, and
where the purchaser was not entitled to
rescission (see also, Michael Richards
Properties Ltd v Corporation of Wardens of
St Saviour’s Parish, Southwark [1975]). In
such cases, the purchaser could be liable
for damages for breach of contract and
would be unable to recover their
deposit. The Court felt bound to adopt
the view expressed by the Court of
Appeal in Universal Corporation and
held, on the facts, that the justice of the
case required that repayment of the
deposit should be ordered, but only on
terms that the purchaser submitted to 
a reduction representing the seller’s
damages.
More recently, Arden LJ in Omar v 
El-Wakil [2001] considered that the
notion of fairness (expressed by Buckley
LJ in Universal Corporation, above) was
‘context-specific’. In the context of a 
conveyancing transaction, in particular,
it was common knowledge that, if a 
purchaser fails to complete the contract,
they are likely to lose their deposit and
so it was important that there should be
an element of certainty attaching to 
the consequences of paying a deposit.
According to Arden LJ, therefore, the
starting-point was that a deposit ‘should
not normally be ordered to be repaid’. In
Omar the seller had not sought to prove
that he had suffered any loss as a result
of the breach of contract. Significantly,
Arden LJ considered this to be irrele-
vant, relying on the principle that, where
a purchaser could not themselves per-
form the contract, the circumstances had
to be exceptional to make it appropriate
for the court to exercise its discretion
under s49(2).
Aribisala
The purchaser in Aribisala sought re-
payment of a 10% deposit (totalling
£216,000) paid for the purchase of two
leasehold properties (comprising a pent-
house and studio) owned by the seller.
The contracts of sale incorporated the
Standard Conditions of Sale (4th ed), which
provided, inter alia, that the seller 
was entitled to rescind the contracts 
and forfeit any deposit if the purchaser
failed to comply with a notice to 
complete the transaction. At the date of
exchange, the purchaser had not
received a firm mortgage offer and, at
the date fixed for completion, his lender
would only offer a reduced mortgage.
He then attempted to obtain additional
funding but the seller eventually
rescinded the contracts and forfeited the
deposits. The purchaser then tried to
negotiate an extension of time and made
new proposals for payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase price. These
proposals were rejected. In the mean-
time, both properties increased in value.
At the hearing, the purchaser argued that
the discretion to order repayment of the
deposit under s49(2) should be exercised
in his favour primarily because: 
(1) it represented a significant proportion
of his assets; 
For further discussion of Aribisala and
s49(2) see issues 204 (p2), 202 (p8) and
195 (p12) of PLJ.
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(2) he was unfamiliar with English con-
veyancing practice; 
(3) he had made various attempts to
obtain additional funding; 
(4) he had been willing to complete the
sales; and
(5) the seller had made a profit from his
breach of contract on the resale of the
properties.
Floyd J, however, was unsympathetic
because: 
(1) The deposit was only 10% of the pur-
chase price and (contrary to the
purchaser’s contention) was not a
large proportion of his assets.
(2) The purchaser was aware of English
conveyancing practice in terms of its
relevant aspects. In particular, he
knew of the need to raise the neces-
sary finance by the completion date
or risk losing the deposit.
(3) His application for additional fund-
ing was made after the completion
date and the eventual offer of finance
was made not to him personally but
to one of his companies.
(4) Although he had shown efforts to
raise the balance of the purchase
money, this was only after the
deposit had become forfeited. In any
event, the terms offered to the seller
were not as good as it could expect to
receive elsewhere.
(5) Although the seller’s profit on resale
(amounting to £366,000) was a factor
to be taken into account, it was not
decisive and certainly not enough
(by itself) to make the situation dif-
ferent from the ordinary case where
a deposit was not refundable. 
Further guidance in 
exercising discretion
The judgment of Floyd J provides fur-
ther guidance on the factors that the
court should consider when exercising
its discretion to order repayment of a
deposit under s49(2). In the first place, it
is important for the court to consider
how close the purchaser had got to actu-
ally performing the contract. In Aribisala
itself, the purchaser was not able to com-
plete the purchase until long after the
deposit had been forfeited under the
terms of the contract. Moreover, the 
requisite funding did not actually mate-
rialise until well beyond the completion
date. In addition, it was relevant to 
consider what alternatives had been
proposed to the seller to complete the
sale and how advantageous they would
be compared with performance of the
actual contract itself. Thus, it would be
‘exceptional’ (in the sense described by
Arden LJ in Omar) for the deposit to be
returned if the purchaser could not per-
form the contract or offer any sensible
alternatives to performance. Unfortu-
nately, in Aribisala, the only alternative
arrangements offered by the purchaser
comprised an offer of a loan from a
Nigerian bank to one of his companies
(and not to him personally) and not for
the full amount of the purchase price
outstanding.
The mere fact that the seller cannot
point to any loss arising from the breach
will not by itself amount to a sufficient
ground for the return of the deposit.
Similarly, an increase in the market value
will not, on its own, amount to a 
sufficiently exceptional circumstance jus-
tifying repayment. However, according
to Floyd J, the question of whether the
seller had made a loss (or a profit) from
the purchaser’s breach could still be rel-
evant in some circumstances – in this
sense, overall economic impact on the
seller remained a relevant factor under
s49(2). Floyd J gave two examples from
the case law. In Tennaro Ltd v Majorarch
Ltd [2003] the Court took into account the
fact that the seller could have sold the
property at a higher price than the
market value at the contractual date of
purchase. Significantly in that case, the
purchaser himself had found a new pur-
chaser (who was willing to pay more
than the contract price) prior to the com-
pletion date. Similarly, in the earlier case
of Dimsdale, referred to above, the Court
was influenced in ordering the return of
the deposit because the seller had resold
at a substantially higher price than it
would have received under the contract
with the defaulting buyer. It is apparent,
therefore, that much will turn on the
facts of the individual case. Thus, by con-
trast, in Midill (97pl) Ltd v Park Lane
Estates Ltd & anr [2008], in the absence of
any special reasons, the seller was held
entitled to keep the deposit despite the
fact that he had resold the property to a
third party for a higher price.
Conclusion
The starting point is that a deposit should
not normally be ordered to be repaid
under s49(2). It is evident that the circum-
stances must be exceptional to make it
appropriate for the court to exercise its
discretion under the subsection. The fact
that the seller has not proved any loss as a
result of the breach of contract cannot (by
itself) justify the return of a deposit.
Similarly, an increase in the market value
of the property will not, on its own, justify
repayment. Such factors must be weighed
against the need for certainty and the fact
that, in the ordinary case, the deposit is
not refundable. ■
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